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T he a rtic le d e a ls w ith J. J. G ib so n 's a c c o u n t o f P ain tin g s as a rre ste d im ages, in a d e q u a te fo r th e stu d y of th e p rin c ip le s o f n a tu ra l vision. Acce p tin g m o st of G ibson's insights, th e a u th o r d iscovers so m e in c o n g ru ities of h is a c c o u n t w hich lead G ibson to tre a t p a in tin g s as b ein g less in fo rm ative th a n an a m b ie n t optic a rra y . S tre ssin g th e fact th a t a c h iro g ra p h ic pictu re is a n in te n tio n a lly p ro d u c e d visual p a tte rn , an e x tra c t of visus,I in fo rm ation, an in fo rm atio n al constant, which is in v a ria n t In every respect, th e a u th o r re a c h e s th e co n c lu sio n th a t th e com plexity of p icto rial codes m ay n e ith e r be co n sid ered a s an evidence s u p p o rtin g th e th esis a b o u t picto rial in v a ria n ts bein g w e a k e r a n d form less, n o r does it prove th e stu d y of p a intin g s to be irre le v a n t fo r th e stu d y of p ercep tio n .
The aim of this article is to ch aracterize the relatio n sh ip betw een the perception of a n a tu ra l optic a rra y a n d the perception of pictures, in this case -of artistic paintings. The question w h eth er a n d to w hat extent do principles of n a tu ra l vision co rrespond to the principles of percep tio n of a n artificially produced optic a rra y is b ro u g h t to focus by th e re c en t discussion betw een the psychologist of perception J. J. G ibson a n d the theoretician of a rt E. H. G om brich. It is o u r in ten tio n to proceed w ith th e discussion com m enting a n d criticizing som e of G ibson's views.
The im portance of im m ediate visual experience fo r the c re ation an d u n d e rstan d in g of p aintings seem s a n u n d en iab le and trivial fact. Less trivial seem s to be the claim that this experience be not only necessary, but also sufficien t to explain the activities p e rfo rm ed by the p a in te r a n d the recipient. This claim is obviously not tru e in the case of p a in te rs w ho a re recognized not only as extrem ely sensitive percipients b u t also as artists endow ed w ith special skills -p artly innate, p a rtly m astered by training. O n the o th e r h a n d this claim w as believed to be tru e of recipients. O u r ability to percieve the visual w orld seem ed to be all th a t was needed fo r the u n d e rsta n d in g of paintings.
To th e exten t to w hich artists them selves belived their aim w as to copy reality they supp o rted this com m on opinion according to w hich each percipient is a com petent recipient.
The line connecting the perception of a n a tu ra l an d of a n a r tificial optic a rra y was believed to be straig h tfo rw ard an d u n problem atic, not only by the p a in te rs a n d th e ir public, bu t also by the re sea rc h ers of perception. T ran sfe rrin g to psychology the geom etric ru le th a t relations of form s on tw odim ensional p lan e are m ore elem entary th a n the relations of bodies in th reed im en sional space, psychologists considered the perception of the tw odim ensional static picture to be the sim plest case of vision, out of which the m ain principles of vision m ay be inferred.
Perception of m oving bodies in threedim ensional space was regarded as a m ore complex case w hich pressuposes not a single projection on the retina, buL a series of them . The key fo r u n d e r stan d in g vision, the form ation of the retin al im age, was ex plained using the laws of clasical optics considering the reflec tion of light an d the em ergence of a picture in a d ark cham ber. The problem psychologists strived to solve was the sam e one R enaissance artists were preoccupied with, nam ely, w hat a re the principles of projection of threedim ensional space on to a twodi m ensional surface.
The tw odim ensional static picture was th u s of double im p o rtan ce to traditional psychology. First, its perception was re g ard ed to be the sim plest case of vision, an d second, pictures contained inform ation about the principles of projection which rule the form ation of retinal image. T hanks to these affo rd an ces the tw odim ensional static im age functioned a s the m odel of n a t ural perception, theory of artificial perspective g ain in g follow ers no t only am ong the artists, but also am o n g the stu d en ts of n a tu ra l perception.
This happy m arriag e betw een the artificial a n d the n a tu ra l finally broke, both parties asking fo r th e ir own rights. M odern pain ters, theoreticians of a rt a n d aesthetician s claim p ain tin g should not be understood as a substitute fo r n a tu ra l perception, but. in its own right, as a specific sym bolic system with its own specific codes, norm s and conventions. The experience of n a tu ral perception turned out to be insufficient fo r the u n d e rstan d ing of pictures, and in fact m isquiding, reducing the sem antical and syntactical complexity of pictorial codes to the strain g h tfo rw ard sim plicity of n a tu ra l vision.
The sam e reaction cam e fro m the other side. Striving to dis cover the principles of natural perception psychologists, p rim a r ily J. J. Gibson, refused to tre a t the picture as a perceptual m od el, show ing unreconciable differences between o u r perception of a n a tu ra l an d o u r reception of an artificial optic array . The perception of painting was recognized as a wholly artificial a f fa ir fro m w hich we m ay draw no inferen ces re g a rd in g the p rin c iples of n a tu ra l vision. A lthough G ibson adm its p ain ters were the first re se a rc h e rs in the field of visual p ercep tio n 1, th eir in vestigations tu rn e d out to be m isleading, o r in th e best case, ir relev an t fo r the u n d e rstan d in g of n a tu ra l perception.
As G ibson's P rim ary intention w as to divorce the n a tu ra l from the artificial, stressing the auto n o m y of the first, his a c count of the a rt of p ain tin g tu rn e d out to be onesided a n d unjust. It is a g ain st this unjust tre a tm e n t th a t G om brich reacted, d e fending the singnificance of artistic conventions and the p la u sibility of a n autonom ous artistic stan d a rd of truth. A lthough our fin al goal is the sam e one as G om brich's, we have chosen d ifferen t strategies to reach it.
W e a re going to accept the follow ing pointsy by Gibson: 1) the form atio n of the retin al im age is n o t the cen tral p h e n om enon the analysis of which leads to the ex p lan atio n of visual perception.
2) It is in ad eq u ate an d m isleading to tre a t the perception of the p icture as the m odel of n a tu ra l vision.
3) The perception of a n a rre ste d im age is a m ore com plex achievem ent th a n the perception of a n am b ien t optic array.
4) The picture is n eith er a n illusion of reality, n o r a n im ita tion of p a st seeing it is not a substitute b u t a n artificial displeay of inform ation.
A ccepting these points we a re going to a rg u e against Gib son's c en tral characterizatio n of pictures. 5) Inv arian ts picked up in a n a rre ste d im age a re weak, am b i guous a n d form less. D eparting fro m G ibson a t this point we aim a t rejecting his consequence, naem ly. 6) R esearch on perception m ay not p ro fit fro m the study of paintings.
1)
Q uite surprisingly, co n trary to th e trad itio n al approach, G ibson p roclaim ed the retin al im age to be u n n ecessary fo r vi sion2. R edefining perception as »an achievem ent of the individu al«3, a continuous pickup of inform ation fro m the changeable am b ient optic array, Gibson did not focuse his investigation on a single, static retin al image, b u t on a dynam ic flow of visual ex perience. The theory of perception w as no m ore u n d ersto o d as the theory of im age form ation, but as the th eo ry of the in fo rm a tion pickup, retin al im age optics w as rep laced by the eccological one.
A ccording to Gibson, p ercep tu al info rm atio n is g rasp ed n e ith e r by representation, n o r by point-to-point projection o r re f lection of the visible w orld on the re tin a of the eye, bu t by the ex tractio n of invariants of structure fro m the flux of inform ation. This extraction presupposes »registering of both persistence a n d change in the flow of stru ctu red inform ation« 4 i. e. in v arian ts in the flux are recognized at the sam e tim e as the flux itself. This cooccurence of the varian t a n d in v arian t aspects th a t g en erate p ercep tu al inform ation corresponds to the b alan ce betw een the re d u n d a n t a n d the novel elem ents th a t enables the tran sm itan ce of inform ation according to semiotic principles. No in fo rm atio n is tran sm itted by the m essage which contains only re d u n d a n t o r only novel elem ents, correspondingly -no p ercep tu al in fo rm a tion w ould be available if the flux of stim ulation contained n o in v a ria n t elem ents or in the case of the co n stan t p resen ce of a single, u nchangeable stim ulus.
From this point of view, the em ergence of a single a n d in v a r ia n t retin al im age is not the m ost elem entary, b u t ra th e r a lim it ing case of vision. The problem the psychologist has to an sw er isn't how do we re a d spatial relations from a flat surface, bu t ra th e r how is it possible th a t we perceive any th in g in a static, u n changeable scene. An account of vision, nam ely, could n ev er be in fe rred from a n account of a single retin al im age, on the con trary , the account of a single re tin a l im age m ust be in fe rred fro m the account of vision as a dynam ic experience.
2)
A ccording to Gibson, static, un ch an g eab le stim ulus m ay in no case be reg ard ed as typical of o u r percep tu al experience, on th e contrary, only changes of a static scene induce p ercep tu al in form ation. Thus, perceptual info rm atio n depends on th e change of the relative position of o u r eye a n d of the things observed an d is in fact twofold: it is inform ation ab o u t o u r su rro u n d in g s a n d inform ation ab o u t ourselves.
The typical p ercep tu al situation is w hen we move th ro u g h o u r environm ent exploring it. Inform atio n pickup resu lts fro m a n activity of exploring,* 5 a n d not from th e passive ab so rp tio n of stimuli. It is not only the re tin a of o u r eye w hich is en g ag ed in perception. O ccular m ovem ents, b in o cu lar disparity, h e ad m ove m ents a n d body m ovem ents a re not less im p o rtan t fo r the vision th a n the re tin a l im age itself. Perception is not a n achievem ent of a single organ, b u t of the whole p ercep tu al system 6.
The perception of a picture does no t no t co rresp o n d to the typical p e rc ep tu a l situation as described by Gibson. A p ictu re is a n u n ch an g eab le visual p a tte rn w hich fixes the relative position of the observer a n d the observed not only th a n k s to the static c h a ra c te r of the p icture itself but also b ecau se it u su ally dictates a single unm oving point of observation. As observation, acco rd ing to Gibson, im plies m ovem ent, »a point of observation a t rest is only the lim iting case of a point of observation in motion, the null case«7. Leaving the relative position of th e observer a n d the observed unchanged, the perception of a p ictu re does no t m an i fest the tw ofold c h a ra c te r of visual in fo rm atio n it engages only o ur eye leaving the rest of o u r p ercep tu al system out of function.
A nother re a so n w hich m akes the p ictu re a n in d eq u ate m od el of a n a tu ra l optic a rra y is the fact th a t the p ictu re is a limited, w hereas the n a tu ra l optic a rra y is a n d u n dbounded, spheric vis ual field. W e do not see the w orld th ro u g h a peep-hole, a n am bient optic a rra y m ust su rro u n d the point of observation com pletely8.
Stressing all the differences betw een the p ercep tio n of the n a tu ra l an d of the artificial optic array, G ibson proclaim ed the picture to be a n in a d eq u ate m odel of vision. Being th e limiting, null case of perception, the perception of p ictu res m ay be ex plained a fte r the account of n a tu ra l vision h as alre ad y b een giv en.
* ibid, p. 239 5 »... looking is alw ays exploring...«, ibid, p. 212 " »One sees th e e n v iro n m e n t n o t w ith th e eyes b u t w ith th e eyes-on-thehead-on-the-body-resting-on-the-ground.«, ibid. 3)
Up to this point the perception of pictures was identified with a view th ro u g h the peephole a t a static scene. W e have re cognized it as different from the typical case of n a tu ra
D ifferent from the a p e rtu re vision, the p erception of pic tures, in this case -of paintings, engages us in a tw ofold activi ty: we m ay either perceive the picture as a n object in o u r s u r rounding, a p a rt of am bient optic array, o r we m ay perceive it as a n artificial optic array, a p resen ted scene. »The p ictu re is both a scene an d a surface, a n d the scene is paradoxically b eh in d th e surface«8.
Gibson claim s this d ual kind of ap p reh en sio n goes on a t th e sam e time, one of them being direct an d the o th er in direct.9 10 Di rectly we perceive the picture as a surface am ong o th e r su rfaces in o u r am bient, indirectly we perceive surfaces in the picture. At this point we m ust disagree w ith Gibson. He n e ith e r gives u s a n account of the notion of indirect perception w hich is c o n tra ry to his own theory of vision, n o r does he explain how is it possible fo r the recipient to p erfo rm two d iscrepant activities a t the sam e time. To avoid this confusion let us claim th a t th e two kinds of apprehensions are both perceptions which do no t occur a t the sam e time. As they are d iscrepant ways of perceiving, we m ay eith er see picture as a n object or see the p resen ted scene. As a m a tte r of fact if we a re to see picture as a scene we m u st a b stain from seeing it as a surface, otherw ise th e objects p resen ted dissolve into the patches of p ain t a n d strokes of th e brush.
W hatever the case m ay be it is obvious th a t th e p ercep tio n of a picture is a m ore com plex activity th a n n a tu ra l vision. It eith er involves both the direct perception of its su rface a n d th e indirect perception of the scene or is a n alte rn atin g p ercep tio n of either the surface, or the scene. In fact it is only the p ercep tio n of the scene which declines from the case of n a tu ra l perception; the perception of pictorial surface is just a n o th e r case of p e r ceiving the am bient optic array.
4)
H aving accepted the view th a t the p erception of pictures in volves two kinds of percep tio n going on a the sam e time, G ibson fo u n d the idea, th a t th e pictu re is a n illusion of reality im plausi ble. If we see the su rfa ce of the picture at th e sam e tim e as the scene, how could we ever believe in th e existence of v irtu al ob jects? In terp retin g the notion of »illusion« a d »delusion«, G ibson proclaim ed the illusion of reality a m yth su p p o rted by the p re v a ile d view on percep tio n -retin al im age optics."
For the sam e re a so n G ibson rejected the id ea th a t the pic tu re was a »literalre-presentation of a n e a rlie r optic array«, »an im itation of p ast seeing«. He clained pictures w ere n e ith e r sub stitutes fo r a b se n t objects n o r fo r a sent experiences, b u t dis plays w hich »record, register, o r consolidate inform ation«.1 1 12
A lthough G ibson's a rg u in g a g ain st the plausibility of the concepts of illusion a n d re p re se n ta tio n reveals no m ore th a n a sim plified a n d su p erficial u n d e rstan d in g of aesth etich dis putes, we do not doubt his conclusion -pictures a re in d eed dis plays of visual inform ation.
5)
A lthough G ibson a rg u e d a g ain st identifying pictures with copies, projections, illusions, rep resen tatio n s o r substitutes of an y kind, he p reserv ed the criterion of th e ir ch aracterizatio n based on the com parison betw een pictures an d the n a tu ra l optic a rra y . C onsidering the perception of pictures a s a lim iting case, p arasitic upon n o rm al vision, he tra n sfe rre d the principle of n a t u ral vision, the pickup of the invarian ts of structure, to the p e r ception of paintings.
If, according to Gibson, the perception-of an object im plies a b stractin g its in v a ria n t stru c tu re from ch an g in g perspectives of its ap p earan ce, to perceive a n object in a p ain tin g would be possible only if we were able to a b strac t its in v arian t stru c tu re fro m a single, static perspective. The fact th a t we can u n d e r stan d pictures forced G ibson to acknow ledge such a possibility, although it contradicts his m ain point about vision being a dy n am ic experience. N evertheless, to sep arate p ersisten t p ro p e rt ies from Lhe ch an g eab le ones in a n u n ch an g in g scene seem s a com plicated enough p rocedure. Therefore, G ibson proclaim ed pictorial invariants to be w eaker and m ore am b ig u o u s th a n in v a ria n ts picked up in a n a tu ra l optic array.
An arre sted im age, a single from , G ibson arg u es, contains som e of the invariants leelonging to the fam ily of form s i.e. to the changing ap p earan ces of the sam e object. If th e p ercep tio n of a n object depends on the detection of in v arian t fe a tu re s w hich u n derlie transform ation, invarian ts them selves m u st be u n d e r stood as form less. Hence, to perceive a n object in a p ictu re m ean s to separate its appearance, its fo rm fro m its underlying, form less, in v arian t structure. Thus, G ibson argues, a lth o u g h the p icture consists of form s, w hat we perceive, th e u n d erly in g in variants, are form less.13
Because of the lim itations of a n artificial optic a rra y , the perception of virtual objects, the pickup of pictorial in v arian ts is m ore complex an d less efficient th a n the percep tio n of objects in the n a tu ra l optic array. Inform ation th a t we pick u p in the course of n a tu ra l vision is, according to Gibson, not only m ore easily available, b u t also is unlim ited, w hereas only a lim ited n u m b er of invariants m ay be preserved by a picture. O u r am bijenet optic array, Gibson argues, is a n inexaustible source of in form ation, w hereas a picture is a n exhaustible one.14 G ibson's account of pictures m akes the pro d u ctio n of p a in tings hardly reasonable. W hy on e arth should we b o th e r to p ro duce pictures of objects which can m ore easily a n d fully be seen directly? As photography functions as a m ore succesive m ean s fo r th e purposes of reg istratio n a n d instruction, p ain tin g s seem to be deprived of th eir inform ative value.
The problem w ith G ibson's account of p ain tin g s lies in his overseeing the difference betw een the kind of in fo rm atio n con tain ed in the am bient optic a rra y an d the kind of in fo rm atio n displayed by the picture. D efining perception as in fo rm atio n pickup Gibson uses the term »information« in a sense in a p p ro p riate fo r the theory of com m unication.15 There is no tra n sm itte r a n d no coded m essage; inform ation in the »sea of energy« s u r ro u n ding us is not conveyed, but simply is there. The am o u n t of inform ation contained in a n am bient optic a rra y is in principle inexhaustible; exploring, we can always reveal new facts ab o u t the world.
According to the realist theory of perception, each percep tion is a pick up of certain inform ation; a choice of a certain in v arian t am ong the possible ones. W hich of the in v arian ts will be extracted, as well as their n u m b er in a certain period of time, de 13 G i b s o n d efines p ic tu re as »an a r r a y of p e rsistin g in v a ria n ts o f stru c tu re th a t a re n am eless a n d form les.«, ibid. p. 271 14 ibid, p. 279 ,s ibid, p. 242, p ends on à g re a t n u m b e r of factors, such as the illum ination, the fu nctioning of o u r p e rc ep tu a l system, o u r interests, beliefs, a t tention, intentions etc. Thus, the pickup of a n in v arian is typical ly a function of a g re a t n u m b e r of variables. A lthough the n u m b e r of invarian ts is potentially unlim ited, actually we alw ays p e r ceive a lim ited am o u n t of inform ation. U nlike the am bient optic array, the p icture is a n in ten tio n al ly pro d u ced visual p attern , a m essage containing actual, a n d not only potential inform ation. The picture is a display of in fo rm a tion th a t is not sim ply there, b u t is alread y a p p re h en d e d by the p ainter, encoded in a specific visual p a tte rn a n d a d d ressed to the potential recipient. As a persisten t actu al m essage th e pic tu re is in v arian not only in the trivial sense of being fro zen in time, being unchangeable, b u t also b acau se it is a n alre ad y ex tra c ted a n d encoded inform ation. Proclaim ing pictorial in v a r ian ts to be w eaker a n d m ore am biguous th a n those picked u p in the n a tu ra l optic array, G ibson forgets th a t his notion of in fo r m ation w as derived fro m symbolic ways of com m unication, such as pictures, he forgets th a t it is reception, a n d not perception th a t is a genuine pickup of invariants.
As distinguished fro m the case of n a tu ra l perception w here the choice of in v arian ts depends on the percipient, pictorial in v a ria n ts have alread y b een picked up, reg istered a n d encoded by the painter. There is noth in g v a ria n t in a picture. In a success ful p a in tin g info rm atio n is encoded in each stroke of th e brush, no elem ent of a successful p ain tin g m ay be re g a rd e d as irrele vant, as a form of a p p e a ra n c e fro m w hich we have to extract w hat is relevant, invariant, i.e. inform ative. The p icture is a re cord of visual in fo rm atio n th a t h a s alread y b een ex tracted by the p a in te r a n d m ade constantly available to the recipient. The p icture is a n in fo rm atio n al constant, a n ex tract of visual in fo r m ation.
In typical p e rc ep tu a l situations visual in fo rm atio n is only one p a rt of the am o u n t of p rocessed inform ation, w hereas in the case of p ictures it is only visual inform atio n th a t is ex tracted a n d p re sen te d of the observer. Thus, pictures enable us to concen tra te on the visual aspect of o u r experience. They p re sen t n o th in g b u t visual in fo rm atio n a n d engage us only as observes. U nlike the cases of n a tu ra l perception w here visual in fo rm atio n usu ally serves som e o th e r purposes, in a n artificially p ro duced optic a rra y visual info rm atio n is p resen ted fo r its own sake.
By extraction a n d a n exclusive co ncentration on the visual in fo rm atio n as well as by storing it a n d m aking it available, pic tu re s m ake us aw are of th e visual com plexity of o u r world. T ran sient a n d fluid aspects arid a p p earan ces of objects th a t a re re g ard ed as irrelev an t in the course of n a tu ra l perception, once extracted and arrested in a n im age prove to be inform ative as well. A single m em ber of the fam ily of form s belonging to one in v ariant underlying stru ctu re contains not only inform ation ab o u t the fam ily to which it belongs, b u t becom es im p o rtan t fo r its own sake. Form extracted a n d represented by the p a in te r is not an incidental snapshot from a series, but is noticed and in tentionally registered by the p a in te r an d hence invariant. As form s them selves a re pictorial invariants it is a b su rd to re g a rd pictorial invariants to be form less. The inform ation of a n artistic p ain ting is not reached by ap stractio n from its fo rm beacuse it is identical with it.
A recipient who tra n sfe rs the principle of n a tu ra l perception -the pickup of underlying form less invariants, to the p ercep tion of an artificial optic a rra y does not u n d erstan d the specific pictorial inform ation which is not hidden behind the form , but lies in the form itself. Such a recipient simply recognizes virtual objects, the »what« of the picture, paying no atten tio n to its »how«. A recipient who u n d e rstan d s pictorial inform ation, on the contrary, recognizes the ways of presentation as being signi ficant, inform ative, he recognizes the p a in te rs's choice of in v ar iants as justifiable.
Such a recipient is not only a n ord in ary percipient, bu t a p erson who h as m astered specific pictorial codes a n th u s h as le arn t to recognize the reaso n s of a certain artistic choice. The know ledge he h as gained governs his perception of pictures, b e com es one of the variables w hich determ ine his choice of in v a r iants.
The reception of pictures reguires some ex tra know ledge th a t a n ordinary perciever lacks an d which determ in es w hat will be percieved. Gibson him self proved the gap betw een p ercep tio n a n d knowledge to be a n a rb itra ry one.16 If percieving is b u t a pickup of inform ation, the kind of inform atio n th a t stan d s at o u r disposal determ ines our perception, determ ines w hat will be the next inform ation th a t we a re going to pick up. Thus th e re ception of pictures is not a m ysterious act of quasi-perception. Projection of m ental im ages o r im ages or im agining, b u t sim ply perception th a t is based on a certain am ou n t of know ledge arleady attained, eith er by perception, o r by v erbal descriptions. A lthough the reception of pictures is m ore com plicated because of the restrictions described in points 1-3, alth o u g h it req u ires a n aw areness of pictures as displays of inform ation, a n d alth o u g h it re a q u ire s som e know ledge of specific pictorial codes, it still is no m ore th a n a n a ffa ir of perception.
6)
Thus, although pictures a re not ad eq u ate m odels with which the study of n atu ral perception should begin, alth o u g h th eir re ception re q u ire s som e ex tra restrictions an d som e ex tra knowl edge, they still req u ire an d develop n oth in g else but o u r p ercept ual skills. G ibson him self recognized pictures as ways to »facil-iate knowing, to aid perceiving, or to extend th e Limits of com prehension«.17 If pictures p erfo rm these functions it is difficult to u n d erstan d how they could be considered to be irrelev an t fo r the study of perception. O f course, they a re not the first step, but surley one of the im p o rtan t stages in the explanation of th e pot entials of o u r perceptual skills. Namely, pictures teach u s to ob serve m ore attentively, they faciliate perceptual inform ational pickup a n d m ake us aw are o f it. If o u r p e rc ep tu a l skills p ro fit from the reception of paintings, the study of p erception should profit fro m it as well. 17 ibid, p. 258
